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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel A. Ligon-Bruno appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence. On 
appeal, Ligon-Bruno challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Shortly after midnight on January 4, 2010, officers received a report of a 
possible burglary in progress at an apartment complex on Wyoming Avenue in 
Hayden, Idaho. (Tr., Vol. I, p.9, L.11 - p.11, L.19, p.85, Ls.13-17, p.87, Ls.16-
18; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, Ls.3-7. 1) The reporting party indicated that he or she had 
observed an unknown male crawl through an exterior window into Apartment No. 
6. (Tr., Vol. I, p.10, Ls.6-8; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, Ls.11-14.) "Upon entering the 
residence through the window, [the suspect] then opened the front door, 
unscrewed a light bulb to make the area dark, [and] re-entered the residence" 
through the front door. (Tr., Vol. I, p.10, Ls.8-21; see also Tr., Vol. II, p.12, 
Ls.14-16.) When officers arrived at the apartment complex, the suspect had just 
exited the apartment "through the window he had entered into." (Tr., Vol. I, p.10, 
Ls.10-12, 22-23.) 
1 The appellate record contains two separately bound volumes of transcripts. 
Consistent with the Appellant's brief, the volume containing the transcripts of the 
6/18/10 and 6/23/10 suppression hearings, the 2/7/11 guilty plea hearing, and 
the 3/23/11 sentencing hearing is cited herein as "Tr., Vol. I." The remaining 
volume, consisting of the transcript of the 10/1/10 hearing at which the district 
court pronounced its ruling on Ligon-Bruno's motion to suppress, is cited herein 
as "Tr., Vol. II." 
1 
Officers contacted the suspect, later identified as Gerard Steger, in the 
parking lot area in front of the apartment complex. (Tr., Vol. I, p.13, L.21 - p.14, 
L.10, p.88, L.7 - p.89, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, Ls.17-21.) Steger appeared be 
"highly intoxicated." (Tr., Vol. I, p.89, Ls.22-24; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, Ls.21-22 .) He 
said he lived in Apartment No. 6, but he did not have any identification that 
confirmed his address.2 (Tr., Vol. I, p.90, Ls.16-17; Tr., Vol. 11, p.12, L.25- p.13, 
L.1.) "[H]e stated several times that nobody else was present inside the 
apartment" but then "changed his story to say that his roommates may be in the 
apartment and then again changed it to say: 'No. They had already left."' (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.19, L.20-p.20, L.6, p.90, Ls.18-23; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.1-3.) 
While one officer continued to question Steger, two others, Deputies 
Franssen and Bixby, went to Apartment No. 6, which was located on the second 
floor of the two-story apartment complex. (Tr., Vol. I, p.15, L.16 - p.16, L.3, 
p.90, L.24 - p.91, L.1; Tr. Vol. II, p.13, Ls.5-8.) From outside of the apartment, 
the officers observed that the front window was partially open. (Tr., Vol. I, p.16, 
L.3 - p.17, L.1, p.91, Ls.7-11, p.92, Ls.19-22; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.8-9.) The 
window was covered by mini-blinds, but lights were on in the apartment and 
Deputy Bixby heard voices and other noises coming from inside. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.16, Ls.3-15, p.17, Ls.10-13, p.43, L.13 - p.44, L.5, p.93, Ls.2-13, p.93, L.24 -
p.94, L.9; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.9-23.) The officers also observed a "small 
infrared-type security camera" positioned between the slats of the mini-blinds 
2 One officer testified that Steger had a driver's license, but the license "showed 
an address on Dakota, which [was] south of [the Wyoming Street] location by 
several blocks." (Tr., Vol. I, p.14, L.18 - p.15, L.7.) 
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and "facing outwards toward the door area of the residence." (Tr., Vol. I, p.16, 
Ls.4-6, p.17, Ls.2-9, p.91, Ls.12-17.) The officers pounded on the door and 
window of the apartment and loudly announced their presence in an attempt to 
make contact with anyone inside. (Tr., Vol. I, p.17, L.14 - p.18, L.10, p.93, 
Ls.19-24, p.95, L.19- p.96, L.4; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.10-17.) After knocking for 
approximately 60 to 90 seconds and receiving no response, Deputy Franssen 
went back downstairs to ask Steger additional questions about the presence of 
other individuals in the apartment and to attempt to ascertain whether Steger did, 
in fact, live there. (Tr., Vol. I, p.18, L.8 - p.19, L.5.) At that point, Deputy 
Franssen learned that central dispatch had called Steger's mother, who stated 
that she knew Steger lived in an apartment on the north side of Wyoming 
Avenue, but she was unable to provide any particular number and could not 
identify which apartment complex it was. 3 (Tr., Vol. I, p.80, Ls.11-19, p.82, 
Ls.10-20.) 
While Deputy Franssen was downstairs talking to Steger, Deputies Bixby 
and Ellis "maintained a visual" on the apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.18, L.25 - p.19, 
L.B.) The officers continued to knock and announce their presence for several 
minutes, during which time Deputy Bixby heard voices coming from inside the 
apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.93, L.21 - p.95, L.4, p.96, Ls.2-4; Tr., Vol. 11, p.13, 
Ls.17-20.) He also heard a "clanking" noise and "things getting shifted around." 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.94, L.3 - p.95, L.15; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.20-23.) After 10 to 15 
3 Deputy Franssen testified that the apartment complex in which Steger claimed 
to live was on the north side of Wyoming Avenue and was one of two relatively 
small apartment complexes on that particular block. (Tr., Vol. I, p.77, Ls.4-9.) 
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minutes of knocking and receiving no response, the officers slid open the window 
and pushed the blinds out of the way to get a clear view into the apartment. (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.96, Ls.2-16; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.1.) The officers again 
announced their presence and ordered any occupants out of the apartment. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.96, Ls.17-19.) Shortly thereafter, Ligon-Bruno "[p]eeked his head 
out around the corner" of the hallway inside the apartment and asked what the 
officers were doing there. (Tr., Vol. I, p.96, Ls.19-24; Tr., Vol. II, p.14, Ls.1-4.) 
His eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and he appeared to be under the influence 
of something. (Tr., Vol. I, p.98, Ls.14-18; Tr., Vol. II, p.14, Ls.4-5.) At the 
officers' direction, Ligon-Bruno exited the apartment through the front window 
and was then detained in handcuffs. (Tr., Vol. I, p.20, L.23 - p.23, L.24, p.98, 
L.21 - p.99, L.13; Tr. Vol. II, p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.5.) Within seconds of asking 
Ligon-Bruno whether there was anyone else inside the apartment, another 
person, identified as Luca Trentino, emerged from the hallway. (Tr., Vol. I, p.23, 
L.25 - p.25, L.6, p.100, Ls.2-1 0; Tr., Vol. II, p.15, Ls.6-10.) Trentino also exited 
the apartment through the front window and was detained in handcuffs. (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.25, Ls.4-6, p.100, Ls.2-10; Tr., Vol. II, p.15, Ls.6-10.) 
After Ligon-Bruno and Trentino were secured on the balcony outside the 
apartment, Deputy Bixby entered the apartment through the front window, 
unlocked the front door and let Deputy Franssen inside. (Tr., Vol. I, p.45, L.18 -
p.47, L.4, p.57, Ls.7-22, p.100, L.11 - p.102, L.10.) Both officers swept the 
apartment to make sure there were no other people inside. (Tr., Vol. I, p.26, 
L.16 - p.27, L.2, p.58, Ls.17-20, p.101, L.12 - p.102, L.7; Tr., Vol. II, p.16, Ls.3-
4 
10.) While in the apartment, the officers observed several items in plain view, 
including roaches, burnt marijuana cigarettes, rolling papers, a homemade 
marijuana pipe, numerous weapons - including a hatchet - a pile of watches and 
other jewelry, and various small electronics. (Tr., Vol. I, p.27, L.3 - p.28, L.5, 
p.103, L.22 - p.104, L.18; Tr., Vol. II, p.17, Ls.6-11.) The apartment smelled of 
burnt marijuana. (Tr., Vol. I, p.28, Ls.7-14, p.112, Ls.9-13; Tr., Vol. 11, p.17, 
Ls.11-13.) The officers also heard the sound of a toilet continuously running; the 
sound was coming from a bathroom near the same area from which Ligon-Bruno 
and Trentino had emerged when they were ordered out of the apartment. (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.28, L.18 - p.29, L.16, p.104, L.19- p.105, L.14; Tr., Vol. II, p.17, Ls.13-
15.) 
After conducting the initial sweep, the officers brought Ligon-Bruno, 
Trentino and Steger back inside the apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.29, L.22 - p.30, 
L.4, p.102, Ls.15-19; Tr., Vol. II, p.16, Ls.10-12.) Ligon-Bruno claimed to live in 
the apartment and identified several items, including a cell phone, some small 
electronics and a small black container, as his. (Tr., Vol. I, p.30, L.5 - p.31, 
L.25.) While Deputy Franssen questioned Ligon-Bruno, Deputy Bixby conducted 
a more thorough sweep of the apartment, opening closet doors to make sure 
nobody else was hiding in the apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.30, L.5 - p.33, L.4, 
p.102, L.17 - p.103, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, p.16, Ls.12-20.) The water in the toilet 
continued to run during this time frame. (Tr., Vol. I, p.33, L.8, p.104, L.21 -
p.105, L.4; Tr., Vol. II, p.17, Ls.13-15.) Concerned about the potential 
destruction of evidence, the officers lifted the lid on the tank of the toilet and 
5 
observed inside several bags of suspected controlled substances. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.33, L.8 - p.34, L.11, p.105, L.19 - p.106, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, p.18, Ls.18-24.) 
Neither Deputy Bixby nor Deputy Franssen removed the items from the toilet 
tank at that time. (Tr., Vol. I, p.106, Ls.10-19.) 
After the second sweep, officers learned that Ligon-Bruno was on felony 
probation for a cocaine charge. (Tr., Vol. I, p.35, L.1 - p.36, L.12; Tr., Vol. II, 
p.19, Ls.11-14.) One of the officers contacted the probation department section 
supervisor, Jarod Cash, and advised him that, while inside Ligon-Bruno's 
apartment to investigate a possible burglary, officers had viewed in plain sight 
evidence of illicit drug use. (Tr., Vol. I, p.36, Ls.13-16, p.126, L.19 p.127, L.6, 
p.128, Ls.17-23, p.137, L.18 - p.141, L.13.) Based upon that information, 
Probation Officer Cash asked the officers to conduct a thorough search of the 
apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.131, Ls.9-13, p.141, Ls.13-15, p.143, L.17-p.144, L.6; 
Tr., Vol. II, p.20, Ls.10-11.) The officers did so and, in addition to the items they 
had previously seen in plain sight, found other items consistent with the use and 
sale of methamphetamine. (Tr., Vol. I, p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.24; Tr., Vol. 11, p.20, 
Ls.17-22.) The officers also retrieved the contents of the toilet tank, which 
included two digital scales and, "approximately, 200 small, plastic Ziplock-type 
bags, hyp[o]dermic needles, spoons, scrapers, straws. Many items that are 
consistent with the illicit use of narcotics." (Tr., Vo!. I, p.39, L.17-p.40, L.15.) 
The state charged Ligon-Bruno with possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to deliver. (R., pp.48-49.) Ligon-Bruno moved to suppress the 
evidence against him, arguing, inter alia, that the warrantless entries of his 
6 
apartment were without legal justification and violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.58-59, 62-69.) He also argued that the evidence 
seized pursuant to the probation search should be suppressed, contending that 
the search was not a valid probation search and, but for the initial warrantless 
entries, would not have occurred. (R., pp.95-96, 102-06.) Following a series of 
evidentiary hearings and extensive briefing, the district court granted Ligon-
Bruno's motion insofar as it sought suppression of evidence obtained as a result 
of a search of his cell phone, but it denied the motion in all other respects. (R., 
p.157.) As is relevant to this appeal, the district court found that the initial entry 
of the apartment was justified by exigent circumstances and as a protective 
sweep. (Tr., Vol. II, p.14, Ls.6-21, p.16, Ls.3-24.) The court found that the 
second sweep of the apartment was not a reentry but was a constitutionally 
reasonable continuation of the first sweep (Tr., Vol. II, p.16, L.12 - p.17, L.3), 
and that the lifting of the toilet lid during the continued sweep was justified by an 
exigency because, under the circumstances, "[t]here was the distinct likelihood 
that items of evidence were either being destroyed or in the water that was 
running continuously in that tank of that toilet" (Tr., Vol. 11, p.18, L.24 - p.19, L. 7, 
p.21, Ls.20-25). Finally, the court found that the search of the apartment 
pursuant to the probation officer's request was "constitutionally supportable 
under the probation search exception to the warrant requirement." (Tr., Vol. II, 
p.23, L.7 - p.26, L.25.) 
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After the district court entered its order on Ligon-Bruno's suppression 
motion, the state amended its Information to charge Ligon-Bruno with felony 
destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence. (R., pp.176-77.) Pursuant 
to a plea agreement, Ligon-Bruno entered a conditional guilty plea to the 
amended charge, reserving the right to seek appellate review of the court's order 
denying his motion to suppress. (R., pp.174-75, 178-80.) The district court 
accepted the plea, imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years 
fixed, suspended the sentence and placed Ligon-Bruno on probation for three 
years. (R., pp.186-91.) Ligon-Bruno timely appeals. (Notice of Appeal 
(Augmentation).) 
8 
ISSUE 
Ligon-Bruno states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ligon-Bruno's motion to 
suppress evidence discovered during three warrantless searches of 
his home because the State failed to meet its "heavy burden" of 
proving an exception to the warrant requirement? 
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Ligon-Bruno failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress? 
9 
ARGUMENT 
Ligon-Bruno Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Ligon-Bruno challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, contending 
the district court erred in its conclusions that the entries and searches of his 
apartment were justified by recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-21.) Ligon-Bruno's arguments fail. A review of the 
record and the applicable law supports the district court's determination that the 
entries and searches were constitutionally reasonable under the exigent 
circumstances, protective sweep and probation search exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. Even if Ligon-Bruno could show error, he has failed to establish 
any basis for suppression because application of the law to the facts adduced at 
the suppression hearing shows that the evidence in this case would have been 
inevitably discovered. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
10 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
The Warrantless Entries And Searches At Issue Were Justified By 
Recognized Exceptions To The Warrant Requirement 
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. "A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls 
within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." 
State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)); accord State v. Roias-
Tapia, 151 Idaho 479, _, 259 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2011). "When a 
defendant has demonstrated that a warrantless search or seizure occurred, it 
becomes the State's burden to prove through presentation of evidence that an 
exception to the warrant requirement applied." State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 
558, 21 P.3d 491, 495 (Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis omitted) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971 ); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 
218-19, 984 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1999); Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 481, 988 P.2d at 
707); accord Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho at_, 259 P.3d at 627. Contrary to Ligon-
Bruno's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the applicable law 
supports the district court's determination that the state met its burden of proving 
the existence of recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement with respect 
to each warrantless entry and search in this case. 
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1. Ligon-Bruno Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's 
Ruling That The Initial Entry Into The Apartment Was Justified By 
Exigent Circumstances And As A Protective Sweep 
The district court found that the officers' initial entry into Ligon-Bruno's, 
apartment, after Ligon-Bruno and Trentino were detained outside the residence, 
was justified by exigent circumstances and as a protective sweep. (Tr., Vol. II, 
p.14, Ls.6-21, p.16, L.3 - p.17, L.3.) It is well settled that entries necessitated by 
"exigent circumstances" do not offend the warrant requirement. Michigan v. 
Tyler, 436 U.S 499, 509 (1978); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 
225 (1993); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432,434,925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App. 
1996). In determining whether exigent circumstances are present, the inquiry is 
"whether the facts reveal 'a compelling need for official action and no time to 
secure a warrant."' State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 624, 768 P.2d 1351, 1357 
(Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509). "The test for application of this 
warrant exception is whether the facts as known to the [officer] at the time of the 
entry, together with reasonable inferences, would warrant a reasonable belief 
that an exigency justified the intrusion." State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 136 
P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 
214, 217 (Ct. App. 2003)); accord State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374-75, 209 
P.3d 668, 671-72 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 470, 197 
P.3d 327, 331 (Ct. App. 2008). "A law enforcement officer's reasonable belief of 
danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling is one type 
of exigency that may justify a warrantless entry." Araiza, 147 Idaho at 375, 209 
12 
P.3d at 672 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990); Reynolds, 146 
Idaho at 470, 197 P.3d at 331). 
A similar rationale underlies the protective sweep exception. A protective 
sweep is justified "when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief 
based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an 
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Maryland v. Buie, 494 
U.S. 325, 337 (1990). Although Buie involved an in-home arrest, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that the exception applies even when the police have 
merely detained a suspect outside the residence, "provided that the officers have 
the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion necessary to support the sweep." 
State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 777-78, 992 P.2d 769, 772-73 (1999). As 
explained by the Court of Appeals: 
Police need not have actual knowledge or absolute proof that 
someone is lurking in the house who poses a threat to the officers. 
Revenaugh, 133 Idaho at 777, 992 P.2d at 772. After effecting an 
arrest or detention at a residence, if the officers can point to 
articulable facts, based upon their knowledge and experience, that 
support their belief that others may be on the premises, the officers 
can sweep the premises for other persons who might be in the 
house. Id. Reasonable suspicion only requires articulable facts 
and inferences supporting a reasonable belief. 
State v. Slater, 133 Idaho 882, 887, 994 P.2d 625, 630 (Ct. App. 1999). "[T]he 
type of offense suspected and the officers' experience with such offenses are 
relevant factors when considering the threat potential to officers on the 
premises." Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho at_, 259 P.3d at 628 (citing Slater, 133 
Idaho at 887, 994 P.2d at 630). 
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In concluding that the officers' initial entry into Ligon-Bruno's apartment 
was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement, the district court made the following, uncontested findings of fact: 
At this point the police did not know whether the man who was 
leaving the apartment belonged there. The police did not know 
whether there was a burglary going on in process. They did not 
know whether there were further perpetrators of a possible burglary 
within that apartment. They did not know whether there were 
potential victims of serious crime within that apartment who needed 
immediate and serious care of law enforcement. They had exigent 
circumstances to enter that apartment and find out if their presence 
was needed for very serious reasons for the safety of citizens' 
ongoing safety. 
(Tr., Vol. 11, p.14, Ls.10-21.) The court subsequently concluded, upon these 
same facts, that the officers legitimately entered the apartment to conduct a 
"safety sweep." (Tr., Vol. II, p.16, L.3 - p.17, L.3.) The record supports the 
district court's conclusions. 
Before entering the apartment, officers had received a report of a potential 
burglary in progress. (Tr., VoL I, p.9, L.11 - p.11, L.19, p.87, Ls.16-18; Tr., Vol. 
II, p.12, Ls.3-7.) The reporting party indicated that a male subject had crawled 
into the apartment through an exterior window, exited through the front door and 
unscrewed a light bulb to make the area dark, and then re-entered the apartment 
through the front door. (Tr., Vol. I, p.10, Ls.6-21; Tr., Vol. 11, p.12, Ls.11-16.) It 
was late at night and the apartment complex was located in a neighborhood that 
Deputy Franssen described as "not law enforcement friendly." (Tr., Vol. I, p.79, 
Ls.4-5.) Both Deputy Franssen and Deputy Bixby testified that they and other 
officers had responded to that particular apartment complex, and the one next to 
it, multiple times to investigate reports of drug activity, domestic violence, 
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burglaries and thefts. (Tr., Vol. I, p.77, Ls.2-17, p.86, L.12 - p.87, L.5; Tr., Vol. 
II, p.12, Ls.3-11.) According to Deputy Franssen, "There's a lot of people in both 
of those complexes that either have notations for being against law enforcement, 
combative felons on state and local probation or parole" and, because of that, 
"It's not a place where [they] send one officer to for 99 percent of the calls." (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.79, Ls.5-10.) 
When officers arrived at the apartment complex, the burglary suspect had 
just exited the apartment through the window and was walking towards the 
parking lot. (Tr., Vol. I, p.13, L.21 - p.14, L.10, p.88, L.7 - p.89, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, 
p.12, Ls.17-21.) The suspect, identified as Steger, appeared to be "highly 
intoxicated." (Tr., Vol. I, p.89, Ls.22-24; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, Ls.21-22.) He claimed 
to live in the apartment that was the subject of the burglary call, but he did not 
have any identification that confirmed his address. (Tr., Vol. I, p.14, L.18 p.15, 
L.7, p.90, Ls.16-17; Tr., Vol. II, p.12, L.25- p.13, L.1.) He was also "vague and 
inconsistent about whether there were other people in the apartment at that 
time." (Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.1-4; see also Tr., Vol. I, p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.6, p.90, 
Ls.18-23.) The officers went to the apartment and attempted for several minutes 
to get the attention of anyone inside by loudly knocking and announcing their 
presence. (Tr., Vol. I, p.17, L.14- p.18, L.10, p.93, L.19- p.96, L.4; , Vol. 11, 
p.13, Ls.5-17.) The lights were on inside the apartment, and Deputy Bixby could 
hear noises, including voices and the sounds of items being moved, but no one 
responded to the officers' knocking and commands. (Tr., Vol. I, p.17, Ls.10-13, 
p.43, L.13 - p.44, L.5, p.93, L.2 - p.95, L.15; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, Ls.5-23.) It was 
15 
only when Deputy Bixby slid open the window and moved the blinds that Ligon-
Bruno, and then Trentino, appeared and responded to the officers' orders to exit 
the apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.96, L.13 - p.100, L.1 0; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, L.24 - p.14, 
L.4.) 
Viewed in their totality, the above facts amply support the district court's 
conclusion that the initial entry of the apartment, after Ligon-Bruno and Trentino 
were detained, was justified by both the exigent circumstances and protective 
sweep exceptions to the warrant requirement. Given the report of a possible 
burglary in progress late at night in a high-crime area, the fact that the suspect 
had been seen entering and exiting the apartment through the window and 
unscrewing the outside light bulb to make the area dark, the fact that Steger was 
unable to produce any identification to confirm his address and made 
inconsistent statements regarding whether anyone else was in the apartment, 
the fact that officers heard voices and other suspicious noises coming from 
inside the apartment but were unable to rouse anyone from the apartment 
despite several minutes of loud knocking, and the fact that Ligon-Bruno and 
Trentino procrastinated in responding to the officers' knocks and commands, the 
police acted objectively reasonably in entering the apartment without a warrant, 
both to ensure the safety and well-being of any potential victims and to dispel the 
legitimate, articulable concern that there may be other individuals in the 
apartment who posed a threat to the officers' safety. 
Ligon-Bruno challenges the district court's conclusion that the initial entry 
was justified, contending that "once Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Luca [Trentino] had 
16 
been removed from the apartment, there was no reason for the police to believe 
that anyone else was still inside." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) This argument fails to 
show error because, even if Ligon-Bruno and Trentino had claimed that there 
was no one else inside the residence, law enforcement would not have been 
required to accept those claims at face value. Roias-Tapia, 151 Idaho at_, 
259 P.3d at 628 ("[O]fficers need not have actual knowledge or absolute proof 
that someone is lurking in the place to be searched who poses a threat to the 
officers.") (emphasis original) (citations omitted); State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 
Idaho 847, 850, 41 P.3d 275, 278 (Ct. App. 2001) (officers responding to a 911 
hang-up call not required to conclude need for help dissipated based solely on 
explanation from person who greeted them upon their arrival); Saifas, 129 Idaho 
at 435, 925 P.2d at 1134 (officers not required to take at face value domestic 
violence victim's assurances that "everything is fine"). 
This is not a case like State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 716 P.2d 1328 (Ct. 
App. 1986), relied upon by Ligon-Bruno, where police effectuated a warrantless 
entry of a home to investigate the homeowner's report of an intruder, despite the 
homeowner's request before the entry to "just forget it." In that case, the Court 
held that "[t]he initial report of an intruder, uncorroborated by other facts, is 
insufficient to overcome a homeowner's right to say 'forget it"' and, as such, did 
not justify the warrantless entry. Rusho, 110 Idaho at 560, 716 P.2d at 1332. 
Here, in contrast, it was not the homeowner but a third party who called the 
police to report the suspicious activity, and the report was far from 
uncorroborated. When police responded, they were unable to confirm whether 
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the first suspect lived at the apartment that was the subject of the burglary ca114 
and whether there were others in the apartment. When officers attempted to 
make contact with the occupants of the apartment they heard voices and noises 
consistent with items being moved around, but the two suspects who were 
eventually detained, Ligon-Bruno and Trentino, procrastinated for several 
minutes in responding to the officers' commands to open the door. 
Given the nature of the report and the suspicious circumstances attendant 
thereto, it was entirely reasonable for the officers to believe that a crime had 
been committed and that there may be other individuals in the apartment who 
were either in need of assistance or who posed a danger to the officers and 
others. Indeed, at least with respect to the protective sweep justification for the 
entry, the fact "that officers in this case did not know how many people were on 
the premises supports the finding of articulable suspicion that they may be in 
danger since they had no way of determining that all persons were present and 
accounted for." Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho at _, 259 P.3d at 628-29 (citation 
4 Ligon-Bruno asserts that, before entering the apartment, "the police had 
already verified via Mr. Steger's mother, that he lived in one of the less than thirty 
apartments on that block." (Appellant's brief, p.17 (citing Tr. Vol. I, p.80, Ls.3-
19).) The cited material does not support this assertion. Regarding whether 
Steger's mother was able to confirm Steger's address, Deputy Franssen 
testified: "[S]he was able to provide that she knew that he lived in an apartment 
across from Ziggy's, which is on the south side of Wyoming but no particular 
number or couldn't even identify to the best of my knowledge which apartment 
complex it was." (Tr., Vol. I, p.80, Ls.15-19.) Deputy Franssen testified that the 
apartment that was the subject of the burglary call was in one of two apartment 
complexes in a single block "on the north side of Wyoming Avenue between 95 
and Government." (Tr., Vol. I, p.76, L.24 - p.77, L.9.) However, there was no 
testimony or other evidence that those complexes were across from or even in 
the same vicinity as the "Ziggy's" referred to by Steger's mother. 
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mitted). Ligon-Bruno has failed to show error in the district court's conclusion 
that the initial warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances and as a 
protective sweep. 
2. Ligon-Bruno Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's 
Conclusion That The Second Sweep Of The Apartment Was Not A 
Reentry But Was A Constitutionally Reasonable Continuation Of 
The Protective Sweep 
After conducting the initial sweep and observing weapons, drugs, 
paraphernalia and other suspicious items in plain view, officers escorted Ligon-
Bruno and Trentino back inside the apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.58, L.17 - p.59, 
L.7, p.101, L.12 - p.102, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, p.16, Ls.3-12.) Thereafter, Deputy 
Bixby conducted a more thorough walk-through of the apartment, looking in the 
bedroom closets to make sure nobody else was hiding in the residence. (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.102, L.17- p.103, L.19; Tr., Vol. II, p.16, Ls.12-20.) During this second 
walk-through, Deputies Bixby and Franssen lifted the lid on the tank of the toilet, 
in which water had been continuously running since the officers first entered the 
apartment, and observed inside the tank several bags of suspected controlled 
substances. (Tr., Vol. I, p.33, L.8 - p.34, L.11, p.105, L.19 - p.106, L.19; Tr., 
Vol. II, p.18, Ls.18-24.) 
The district court ruled with respect to the second walk-through of the 
apartment and the opening of closet doors that such was not a reentry of the 
apartment but was instead a constitutionally reasonable continuation of the initial 
protective sweep. Specifically, the court ruled: 
Mr. Ligon-Bruno and Mr. Trentino were brought back into the 
apartment at that point. And the testimony was that, and this was 
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an interesting phrase for the Court, a more thorough visual sweep 
of the same rooms were done, including closets and bedrooms. 
I'm not sure what a visual sweep is other than potentially one using 
their eyes to sweep the room. But it looks like the deputies went 
back through the house to some degree, but they went to different 
places, into the closets and into the bedrooms, to see if there were 
other individuals there. 
The Court finds that to be not necessarily a reentry of the 
house. The police are already in the house. They are already 
conducting a safety sweep of that house. And just the fact that 
they bring the suspects into the house and then continue that 
safety sweep in a bit more detail does not mean that there was a 
reentry or that the safety sweep had lost its legitimacy and 
importance. The further, more detailed safety sweep was 
legitimate under the circumstances, and the Court finds it to be 
constitutionally supportable. 
(Tr., Vol. II, p.16, L.10 - p.17, L.5.) The court also ruled that the lifting of the 
toilet tank lid during the continued sweep was justified by an exigency because, 
under the circumstances, "[t]here was the distinct likelihood that items of 
evidence were either being destroyed or in the water that was running 
continuously in the tank of that toilet." (Tr., Vol. II, p.18, L.24 - p.19, L.7, p.21, 
Ls.20-25.) 
On appeal, Ligon-Bruno does not appear to challenge the district court's 
determination that the officers had reason to believe, based on the continuous 
running of water in the toilet tank and their prior observations of illegal activity in 
the residence, that items of evidence were potentially being destroyed. Instead, 
he argues that the court erred in concluding that the second walk-through of the 
apartment was justified as a continuation of the protective sweep (Appellant's 
brief, pp.19-21) and, he contends, the contents of the toilet tank should be 
suppressed (or, at the very least, could not have contributed to the justification 
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for the subsequent probation search) because "it was not until the second search 
had begun that officers became concerned about the running of the toilet" 
(Appellant's brief, p.21 (citation omitted)). Ligon-Bruno's argument fails because 
the record and the applicable law support the district court's determination that 
the second, more thorough walk-through of the apartment was justified as a 
continuation of the protective sweep. 
As previously explained, a protective sweep is a recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement and is justified when there are "articulable facts which, 
taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a 
reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an 
individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Maryland v. Buie, 494 
U.S. 325, 334 (1990). Officers executing a protective sweep "need not have 
actual knowledge or absolute proof that someone is lurking in the house who 
poses a threat to the officers." State v. Slater, 133 Idaho 882, 887, 994 P.2d 
625, 630 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 777, 992 
P.2d 769, 772 (1999)). Rather, the reasonable suspicion standard requires only 
"articulable facts and inferences supporting a reasonable belief." Slater, 133 
Idaho at 887, 994 P.2d at 630. When such facts exist, "officers can sweep the 
premises for other persons who might be in the house." kl (citing Revenaugh, 
133 Idaho at 777, 992 P.2d at 772). The sweep must, however, "be narrowly 
confined to a 'cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found'" 
and must "last 'no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of 
danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and 
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depart the premises."' State v. Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho 479, _, 259 P.3d 625, 
627 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 494 U.S. at 335-36). 
Application of the above legal principles to the facts of this case supports 
the district court's determination that Deputy Bixby's second walk-through of the 
apartment was a constitutionally permissible continuation of the initial protective 
sweep. The facts justifying the initial sweep are detailed in Section C.1, supra, 
and need not be repeated here. In light of the circumstances confronting the 
officers at the time of the initial sweep - e.g., the report of a possible burglary in 
progress late at night in a high-crime area, the inability to confirm Steger's 
address or to ascertain from him whether other people were present inside the 
apartment, the sound of voices and other suspicious noises coming from inside 
the apartment, and the failure of Ligon-Bruno and Trentino to promptly respond 
to the officers' knocks and commands - there can be little question that the 
officers would have been justified during their initial sweep to look in the 
bedroom closets in search of persons who might pose a threat to them. See 
Buie, 494 U.S. at 335 (officers conducting protective sweep may make "cursory 
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found"); Rojas-Tapia, 151 
Idaho at 259 P.3d at 627 (same). Although Ligon-Bruno argues otherwise, 
that the officers did not initially do so is of no constitutional significance. 
As noted by the district court, the officers were already legitimately in the 
house to conduct a protective sweep, "[a]nd just the fact that they bring the 
suspects into the house and then continue that safety sweep in a bit more detail 
does not mean that there was a reentry or that the safety sweep had lost its 
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legitimacy and importance." (Tr., Vol. II, p.16, L.21 - p.17, L.3.) In fact, the 
importance of conducting a full sweep of the apartment was actually heightened 
after the initial sweep because it was during the first sweep that officers saw 
evidence of illegal drug activity and "numerous weapons" - including baseball 
bats, knives and a hatchet - "throughout the house." (Tr., Vol. I, p.103, L.22 -
p.104, L.5; Tr., Vol. II, p.17, L.6-20.) Together with the information the officers 
already knew before entering the apartment for the first time, these observations 
supplied the officers with a constitutionally reasonable basis to conduct the more 
thorough sweep to look in closets where other persons posing a threat to the 
officers might be found. See Rojas-Tapia, 151 Idaho at _, 259 P.3d at 628 
(considering potential presence of weapons as factor and upholding protective 
sweep of building in relatively close proximity to area where suspects were 
detained where "officers had no knowledge as to the number of people on the 
premises, nor had any information that would relieve their concerns that any 
other persons on the premises were armed"); Slater, 133 Idaho at 887-88, 994 
P .2d at 630-31 (reasonable for officers investigating suspected drug activity to 
believe, after knocking and announcing presence without any answer and seeing 
suspects run and hide, that there were potentially others inside the residence 
could have easily secreted themselves in the area swept). 
On appeal, Ligon-Bruno relies on Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), 
to support his argument that the district court erred in its conclusion that the 
second walk-through of the apartment was justified as a continuation of the 
protective sweep. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) Mincey, however, is both legally 
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and factually inapposite. Mincey is an exigent circumstance case and, 
unsurprisingly, does not discuss or even cite to the legal requirements for a 
protective sweep, an exception to the warrant requirement that was first 
addressed by the Supreme Court in Buie, supra, 12 years after Mincey was 
decided. Nor do the facts of Mincey bear any resemblance to the facts that 
justified the continued protective sweep in this case. In Mincey homicide 
investigators, having already located all of the persons in Mincey's apartment, 
nevertheless conducted a four-day warrantless search of the apartment "that 
included opening drawers and ripping up carpets." Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393. In 
contrast, the officers in this case conducted a cursory inspection of Ligon-
Bruno's apartment and, with the exception of the toilet (the opening of which was 
independently justified by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, see 
Section C.3, infra), limited their search to only those spaces where persons 
posing a threat to them may be found. In short, nothing about Mincey supports 
Ligon-Bruno's claim of error in relation to the district court's ruling that the 
second walk-through was a constitutionally reasonable continuation of the initial 
protective sweep. 
As further support for his claim that "there was no basis for the additional 
warrantless search of his home that occurred [after] the deputies took Mr. Ligon-
Bruno and the two other detainees inside the apartment," Ligon-Bruno points to 
Deputy Bixby's testimony on cross-examination. (Appellant's brief, p.20.) When 
asked by defense counsel, "[W)hat indications did you find [during the initial 
sweep] that would lead you to believe that someone else was armed or 
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dangerous or anything like that inside the residence," Deputy Bixby responded, 
"Nothing. That's what a safety sweep is. You go in, check the residence, come 
back out." (Tr., Vol. I, p.121, L.20 - p.122, L.2.) According to Ligon-Bruno, 
Deputy Bixby's statement conclusively demonstrates that officers did not have 
any reasonable basis to conduct a more detailed sweep for the presence of 
other potentially dangerous individuals in the apartment. (Appellant's brief, 
p.20.) Ligon-Bruno is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, read in context and in light of the officer's prior testimony regarding 
the circumstances that unfolded when officers arrived at the apartment to 
investigate the report of a possible burglary in progress, Deputy Bixby's 
testimony on cross-examination can only reasonably be construed as meaning 
that, after the initial entry, he did not have any more or less reason to believe that 
others might be present in the apartment who might pose a threat to the officers. 
In light of the fact that the officers had a sufficient level of reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that would have entitled the officers to look in the bedroom closets 
upon their initial entry, it is of no consequence that Deputy Bixby personally 
believed that the initial entry did not provide any additional facts upon which to 
ultimately conduct a cursory inspection of those closets. 
Second, even if Deputy Bixby's testimony on cross-examination could be 
construed as a definitive statement that, after the initial sweep, he did not 
personally believe that "someone else was armed or dangerous" inside the 
apartment, such statement does not establish that the continued sweep was 
unlavrful. The applicability of the protective sweep exception does not depend 
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on the subjective beliefs of one officer, but turns instead on an objective test that 
is satisfied when there "articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in 
believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to 
those on the arrest scene." Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. Again, the facts known to the 
officers at the time of the initial entry, combined with the additional fact that the 
officers observed weapons and evidence of drug activity during the initial sweep, 
provided the officers with an objectively reasonable basis to continue the 
protective sweep to check for other persons who might harm the officers. Ligon-
Bruno has failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that the second 
walk-through of the apartment and the opening of closet doors was a 
constitutionally permissible continuation of the initial protective sweep. 
3. Regardless Of The Legality Of The Second Sweep, Officers Were 
Justified By Exigent Circumstances In Lifting The Lid Of The Toilet 
Tank To Prevent The Destruction Of Evidence 
"Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, 
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence is justification for what would 
otherwise be illegal police conduct." State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 748, 692 
P.2d 1174, 1180 (1984); accord Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) 
(imminent risk of destruction of evidence is an exigency that justifies a 
warrantless search); State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 912, 136 P.3d 379, 383 
(Ct. App. 2006) (same); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 559, 716 P.2d 1328, 
1331 (Ct. App. 1986) (same). In order for the this exception to apply, the police 
must have probable cause to believe that evidence is present in the place to be 
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searched and must also possess "a reasonable belief that unless they act, the 
evidence will be destroyed." Hoak, 107 Idaho at 748-49, 692 P.2d at 1180-81 
(footnote omitted); accord Rusho, 110 Idaho at 559, 716 P.2d at 1331 (citing 
Mincey, 437 U.S. 385) ("Probable cause and a compelling emergency, such as 
imminent destruction of evidence ... must be shown."). 
Applying theses principles in this case, the district court ruled that the 
officers were justified by exigent circumstances in lifting the lid of the toilet tank 
to prevent the possible destruction of evidence. Specifically, the court reasoned: 
The police also - again I come back to the sound of the 
toilet. The police noticed that the toilet had been running 
continuously for a several-minute period and lifted up the lid of the 
tank of the toilet and in doing so found plastic bags that the Court 
would probably learn if this matter goes to trial contained some of 
the drugs that are part of this allegation. The Court finds that it was 
reasonable for the police to lift the lid of that toilet to find out what 
was going on under exigent circumstances, given the 
circumstances of seeing the paraphernalia and the smell of burning 
marijuana and a continuously running toilet. There was a distinct 
likelihood that items of evidence were either being destroyed or in 
the water that was running continuously in the tank of that toilet. 
(Tr., Vol. II, p.18, L.18 - p.19, L.7; see also p.21, Ls.20-24 (finding "the items in 
the particular toilet tank were found pursuant to an exigent circumstances [sic] of 
possible destruction of evidence and it was appropriate for the police to lift the lid 
of that tank").) This ruling is supported by the record which shows that, before 
entering the apartment, Deputy Bixby heard things being moved around and a 
"clanking" sound coming from the general area in the apartment where the 
bathroom is located. (Tr., Vol. I, p.93, L.19 - p.95, L.18, p.104, L.21 - p.105, 
L.7.) While performing their initial sweep of the apartment, officers detected the 
smell of burnt marijuana, observed burnt marijuana cigarettes and drug 
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paraphernalia, and heard the sound of water continuously running in the toilet 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.27, L.3 - p.28, L. 18, p.103, L.22 - p.104, L.15, p.104, L.21 - p.105, 
L.5, p.112, Ls.3-13; Tr., Vol. 11, p.17, Ls.8-15.) In addition, Deputy Franssen 
testified that, in his experience, "toilets are commonly used to conceal or destroy 
evidence because of the very nature of it being water. Anything that's water 
soluble can be lost." (Tr., Vol. I, p.33, Ls.20-24.) Taken together, these facts 
supplied the officers with probable cause to believe that drugs were present and 
that, unless they acted, items of evidence would be destroyed. 
As noted in Section C.2, supra, Ligon-Bruno does not appear to challenge 
district court's determination that the officers had reason to believe, based on the 
continuous running of water in the toilet tank and their observations of illegal 
drug activity in the residence, that items of evidence were potentially being 
destroyed. Rather, he claims only that the contents of the toilet tank should be 
suppressed because officers only "became concerned about the running toilet" 
during the second protective sweep, which Ligon-Bruno claims was unlawful. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.20-21.) Ligon-Bruno is incorrect. Both Deputy Franssen 
and Deputy Bixby testified that they heard the toilet running upon their initial 
entry into the apartment. (Tr., Vol. I, p.28, Ls.17-18, p.104, L.19 - p.105, L.4.} 
Deputy Franssen continued to hear the toilet running while questioning Ligon-
Bruno in the front room of the apartment and at that point believed 1 "because of 
the area that the [suspects] had come from as well as the continuous running of 
the toilet, that the toilet had been used to destroy evidence." (Tr., Vol. I, p.28, 
Ls.18-24, p.33, Ls.5-11.) Thus, while the officers did not lift the toilet tank lid 
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until the second sweep, they were actually in possession of all the facts giving 
rise to the exigency as a result of their initial entry. Regardless of the legality of 
the second sweep, Ligon-Bruno has failed to show error in the district court's 
ruling that the lifting of the toilet tank lid was justified by exigent circumstances. 
4. Even Assuming The Continued Sweep And Lifting Of The Toilet 
Tank Lid Were Unlawful, Ligon-Bruno Has Failed To Show Any 
Basis For Suppression Because The Evidence In This Case Would 
Have Been Inevitably Discovered Pursuant To A Valid Probation 
Search 
With the exception of the contents of Ligon-Bruno's cell phone, which the 
district court suppressed (Tr., Vol. II, p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.9), all of the evidence in 
this case was seized pursuant to a probation search. The district court ruled that 
the probation search was lawful, both because Ligon-Bruno had consented as a 
term of his probation agreement to submit to searches of his residence upon the 
request of his probation officer, 5 and because the information the police 
conveyed to the probation officer regarding their observations of illegal activity at 
Ligon-Bruno's apartment gave the probation officer reasonable grounds to 
believe that Ligon-Bruno was in violation of his probation. (Tr., Vol. II, p.19, L.8 -
p.20, L.9, p.23, L.7 - p.26, L.25.) Ligon-Bruno does not challenge the court's 
determination that the search conducted at the probation officer's request met 
the legal requirements of a valid probation search. Instead, he argues solely that 
the probation search "was not lawful because it was only authorized as a result 
5 The district court took judicial notice of three documents from Kootenai County 
Criminal Case No. 05-17960 that together set forth the conditions of Ligon-
Bruno's probation. (Tr., Vol. I, p.144, L.12 - p.147, L.11.) The order imposing 
the conditions of probation is contained in the appellate record at pages 87-96. 
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of the discovery of contraband during the initial unlawful searches, thereby 
rendering any evidence discovered as a result fruit of the poisonous tree." 
(Appellant's brief, p.21.) Ligon-Bruno has failed to show any basis for 
suppression because, as set forth above, the record and the applicable law 
support the district court's conclusions that each entry and search was justified 
by a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Even assuming the 
second walk-through of the apartment and the lifting of the toilet tank lid were 
unlawful, all of the evidence in this case would have been inevitably discovered 
pursuant to the valid probation search based on the officers' observations during 
the initial constitutionally permissible protective sweep. 
The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule. 
See State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 101-102, 57 P.3d 807, 812-813 (Ct. 
App. 2002). Where the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of proof 
that the evidence at issue inevitably would have been found by lawful means, 
then exclusion of the evidence is improper even if it was actually obtained by 
constitutionally improper means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); 
Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 497-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001). The 
underlying rationale of this rule is that suppression should leave the prosecution 
in the same position it would have been absent the police misconduct, not a 
worse one. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44; Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho at 102, 57 P.3d at 
813. 
Here, there can be no question that the evidence seized pursuant to the 
probation search would have been lawfully discovered even if officers had not 
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conducted a second walk-through of the apartment and lifted the toilet tank lid. 
After detaining Ligon-Bruno and ascertaining his identity, officers learned from 
central dispatch that Ligon-Bruno was on felony probation. (Tr., Vol. I, p.35, 
Ls.5-7.) They contacted the probation department and advised the section 
supervisor that they were inside Ligon-Bruno's apartment to investigate a 
possible burglary and had observed in plain view evidence of illicit drug activity. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.36, Ls.13-16, p.126, L.19-p.127, L.6, p.128, Ls.17-23, p.137, L.18 
- p.141, L.13.) Even assuming officers had not conducted a second walk-
through and lifted the toilet tank lid, the evidence of illegal drug use the officers 
observed during their initial constitutionally permissible protective sweep would 
have been sufficient by itself to justify the ensuing probation search. See United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (probation search based on reasonable 
suspicion that the probationer is in violation of his probation is reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment); State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-88, 95 P.3d 
635, 638-39 (2004) (same); State v. Adams, 146 Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240, 
242 (Ct. App. 2008) (same). Because the evidence in this case would have 
been inevitably discovered pursuant to that valid probation search, Ligon-Bruno 
has failed to show any error in the denial of his motion to suppress. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfu!ly requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the 
district court's order denying Ligon-Bruno's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 1ih day of February 2012. 
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